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Abstract
Residential location decision is often a household joint decision involving
several decision-makers. These different decision-makers usually have diverg-
ing preferences, especially in dual-earner households, when spouses work at
different locations. Since about half a century, literature on residential lo-
cation has studied in great detail the influence of socio-demographic char-
acteristics (and in particular the differences between females and males or
between multiple-worker and single-worker households). However, there is no
research devoted to the within-family joint decision process leading to resi-
dential location decision (and work-place decisions). In the context of Paris
Area, we analyze differences between spouses’ values of commuting times and
show that spouses’ disparities in commuting decisions is a key element in
the intra-household decision process. The single-worker household approach
leaves aside by construction important intra-household considerations that
influence commuting time and accessibility to jobs. We review different mod-
els useful to study intra-household decisions in dual-earner households. To
do that, we base our analysis on the framework introduced by Chiappori,
de Palma, Picard, and Inoa (2013), which applies the collective approach of
household behavior(Chiappori, 1988; Chiappori, 1992) to describe residential
location choice of dual-earner households. This collective approach has been
used in several economic fields, but not in urban and transport economics so
far. Furthermore, we argue that the framework developed by Inoa, Picard,
and de Palma (2013), can also be adapted to analyze the joint residential
and job location decisions in a two-worker household. The analysis is based
on two accessibility variables (one for each spouse) embedded in a three-level
nested Logit model which is used to study the interdependence of residential
and workplace locations, while accounting for variation of preferences for job
types across individuals.
Keywords: intra-household interaction, residential location, Paris region
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1 Introduction
The residential and job location choice literature is dominated by models
considering a single decision-maker in each household. In such early models,
the analysis of joint decisions (such as residential location choices, involving
monetary cost, but also emotional and time dimensions) are usually simplified
by assuming away the within-household bargaining process. De facto, it is
assumed that there is a single decision maker, who can be seen as a more
or less benevolent dictator, to use the terminology introduced more than 30
years ago, by Gary Becker, the father of Economics of the Family.
In the economic literature, models considering a single decision-maker are
usually referred to as "unitary models". Many researchers, especially in family
economics, tend to criticize this assumption, questioning the hypothesis that
the behavior of multi-person households can be described by a single decision-
maker model satisfying the basic preference axioms (such as transitivity, for
example). Incidentally, we know, since the Arrow impossibility theorem, the
difficulty to aggregate preference within small groups.
In the context of residential location, it is highly probable that some intra-
household bargaining process plays an important role in dual-earner house-
holds. Intra-household bargaining process refers to the negotiation process
within the household with respect to joint decisions, such as residential lo-
cation, use of the car (when there is a single car), or choice of a holiday
location. In particular, in the context of residential location, each worker in
the household has his own preferences and constraints depending on his own
workplace, generally different from the workplaces of the other workers in the
same household.
When there is more than one decision-maker in the household, a com-
plex bargaining process usually takes place, and the resulting decisions would
appear irrational if they were analyzed using a single decision-maker model.
Since the 80’s, economic literature has developed models analyzing the within-
family bargaining process in other contexts such as labor supply or consump-
tion. For example, Lundberg and Pollak (1993), developed a specific bargain-
ing process in the presence of multiple interrelated decisions made by multiple
decision-makers, whereas Chiappori (1988) developed the so-called "collective
model". Collective models take account of the fact that multi-person house-
holds face joint decisions involving more or less altruistic members with spe-
cific preferences and constraints. In collective models, decisions are assumed
Pareto-optimal in the sense that the solution of the bargaining process is on
the Pareto frontier, that is, that it would not be possible to increase the well-
being of one household member without decreasing the well-being of at least
another member. Spouses jointly make decisions leading to a Pareto-optimal
outcome, if it is not possible to make one spouse better-off without making
the other spouse worse-off. Pareto-optimality can be bested empirically, and
is usually verified. By contrast, the assumptions and/or conclusions of unitary
models are usually rejected in multi-person households.
Recently, economists and transport researchers have worked on explain-
ing the effect of intra-household variables on the choice of residential loca-
tion and workplace (Waddell, 1996; Abraham and Hunt, 1997; Sermons and
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Koppelman, 2001). Their analysis addressed the multiple-member household
decisions, but not the multiple decision-maker problem, involving a within-
household bargaining process. Overall, intra-household considerations remain
limited in this literature; the theoretical and empirical contributions on the
effect of intra-household variables on the residential location and workplace
choices are scarce. In particular, there are no published contributions on
within-household bargaining process in location decisions (with the exception
of the ongoing research by Chiappori, de Palma, Picard, and Inoa (2013)).
Our objective in this chapter is to make a first step to bridge the gap be-
tween two strands of literature which developed independently up to now. The
first one covers location choice models that consider more than one household
member or worker, but a single decision maker. The second one focuses on
the decision process in other contexts, when several decision makers have di-
verging preferences and constraints. The ultimate objective is to make a step
forward in the analysis of joint mode choice and residential and job location
choices in a dual-earner household.
Beyond the simple differentiation of location choice by socio-demographic
characteristics, recent models dealing with family location decisions allow
for the identification of differences between females and males, and between
multiple-worker households and single-worker households. In the context of
Paris Area, we analyze differences between spouses’ commuting times, and
we show that spouses’ disparities in commuting is a key element in the intra-
household decision process. The single-worker household approach might leave
aside important intra-household considerations that influence commuting time
and accessibility to jobs. As a consequence, the one-worker oriented location
choice models may lead to misleading conclusions for dual-earner households.
We review here different models potentially useful to study intra-household
decisions. We assess the framework introduced by Chiappori, de Palma, Pi-
card, and Inoa (2013), which applies the collective approache of household
behavior (Chiappori, 1988; Chiappori, 1992) to describe residential location
choice of dual-earner households. In the context of a collective model (assum-
ing Pareto-optimality), bargaining powers play an important role to measure
the values of time of the two spouses.
We then argue that the framework introduced by Inoa, Picard, and de
Palma (2013), could also be adapted to analyze residential and job location
choices in a two-worker household. By accounting for two accessibility vari-
ables (one for each spouse), their three-level nested Logit model could be used
to study the interdependency of residential location and workplace, while ac-
counting for variation of preferences for job types across individuals. This
could be performed both in single- and in two-worker households.
The outline of the chapter is briefly described below. Section 2 provides
some background of the studies analyzing household behavior in multi-person
households. We focus the literature specifically on residential location and
mode choice studied in this chapter. Differences between female and male
commuting time in Paris Region are presented in Section 3, which also an-
alyzes the role of spouses respective travel times in a model of residential
location that considers intra-household decisions, and explores original consid-
erations in individual-specific accessibility measures. Section 4 discuss insights
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for future work and concludes.
2 Literature review
The models we review here present the two literature strands which developed
independently up to now. The transportation and location choice literature
has mainly modeled the household as a single decision-making unit. Timmer-
mans (2006) offers an extensive review on past research in the transportation
literature, whereas Vermeulen (2002a); Vermeulen (2002b) reviews the work
on unitary and collective household models in other contexts.
Different literature reviews and special issues have already been interested
in the modeling of intra-household decisions in such contexts. Two special
issues on modeling intra-household interactions, edited respectively by Bhat
and Pendyala (2005) and by Timmermans and Zhang (2009), have become
the main references in the transportation literature. The former focuses on
utility-maximizing models, whereas the latter presents other methods such as
micro-simulation approaches and group decision theory.
de Palma, Picard, and Inoa (2013) update the previous reviews of intra-
household decision models in the transportation literature, and focus on dis-
crete choice models. It differs from such earlier reviews by putting more
emphasis on economics of the family and collective models of household be-
havior.
These reviews reveal that two general research streams have modeled in-
dependently multi-person households and intra-household decisions. On the
one hand, there has been interesting research on within-family interactions on
what can be broadly categorized as the transportation, activity-demand, and
location literature, which paid no attention to the within-family bargaining
process itself. On the other hand, household decision-making processes have
been studied in depth in the Collective Model literature, but they paid no
attention to residential location, workplace or other transport-related choices.
These two strands of literature differ not only with respect to their topics,
but also with respect to the nature (discrete versus continuous) of the deci-
sions analyzed. As a consequence, these two strands of literature used and
developed totally different techniques. This distinction is at the core of new
theoretical and empirical developments.
2.1 Family decisions in the transportation literature
The transportation and activity-demand literature heavily relies on discrete
choice modeling and more occasionally on structural equation modeling and
seemingly unrelated regressions (a system of equations, where the error terms
are assumed to be correlated across equations), to explain the time invested
in activities by the household members, as reported by Srinivasan and Bhat
(2005). Furthermore, Timmermans (2006) classifies transportation and activity-
demand works that consider intra-household decision-making into three cate-
gories: micro-simulation (simulation of a household member daily activity-
travel pattern), rule-based (“if-then” decision tree structures) and utility-
maximizing models (RUM and time allocation approaches).
The discrete choice models of intra-household decisions in the transporta-
tion, activity-demand, and location literature covers choices from the short
4
run to the long run decision context.
Contributions regarding the long term decision context includes choices of
residential and job location, mobility, and car ownership as in Abraham and
Hunt (1997); Freedman and Kern (1997); Sermons and Koppelman (2001);
Waddell (1996).
Contributions regarding the short term decision context includes model-
ing (joint) activity and task allocation, travel, car sharing, and mode choice
as in Wen and Koppelman (1999); Wen and Koppelman (2000); Gliebe and
Koppelman (2002). Scott and Kanaroglou (2002); Vovsha, Petersen, and Don-
nelly (2003); Vovsha, Petersen, and Donnelly (2004a); Vovsha, Petersen, and
Donnelly (2004b); Bradley and Vovsha (2005) work on discrete choice of main-
tenance activities allocation in tour-based travel demand modeling systems,
as Srinivasan and Bhat (2005); Srinivasan and Bhat (2006) and others.
More details can be found in the special issues and reviews mentioned
before: Bhat and Pendyala (2005); Timmermans (2006); Timmermans and
Zhang (2009); de Palma, Picard, and Inoa (2013).
2.2 Intra-household decision process in the economic lit-
erature
Following the impetus originated from seminal work by Nobel Prize laureate
Gary Becker (1965; 1973; 1974; 1974; 1991), recent developments in economics
of the family, broadens the classical research field, which initially focused on
fertility and labor supply, to new questions such as the marriage decision or
choices related to the number of children, their education, and the allocation
of tasks and time among household members.
When modeling household decisions, the household was traditionally con-
sidered as a single decision-maker, and the study of the decision-making pro-
cess and of the transactions between family members were neglected, as dis-
cussed in de Palma, Picard, and Inoa (2013). These so called "unitary models"
neglect the differences and potential conflicts between the interests of the dif-
ferent household members, and implicitly assume that household members
pursue consensual objectives. This assumption leads to a poor understanding
of decision mechanisms within the household, even when individual-specific
variables (such as spouses’ respective ages or education levels) are introduced
in the model.
Collective models and other within-households bargaining models aim at
answering the theoretical and empirical criticisms addressed to unitary mod-
els of family decision-making. They were developed in two major directions.
“Strategic” models rely directly on the theory of non-cooperative games (see,
e.g. Ashworth and Ulph (1981); Leuthold (1968)), while “collective” models
proposed by Chiappori (1988); Chiappori (1992) rely on the basic assumption
that the household decision process leads to Pareto-efficient allocations. The
bargaining process may then be either explicit (as in McElroy and Horney
(1981), or in Lundberg and Pollak (1993)), or non-specified (as in Chiap-
pori (1988); Chiappori (1992)). In the latter case, the bargaining process is
very general and not restrictive, only assuming Pareto-optimality. Pareto-
optimality hypothesis seems natural for analyzing household decisions since
family members, who interact over a long period, are probably able to find
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mechanisms leading to efficient decisions.
As shown by Chiappori (1992), collective models can be used to study the
welfare level of each household member, and therefore to analyze and mea-
sure in a consistent way the redistributive effects of any economic policy, not
only at the household level but also at the individual level. More specifically,
he showed that, under some rather plausible conditions, individual utility
functions can be recovered from household behavior (and disentangled from
bargaining power effects, whereas bargaining effects induce a bias in the mea-
surement of preference parameters in unitary models).
The collective model introduced by Chiappori (1988); Chiappori (1992)
was originally restricted to continuous decisions, because it relied on the first-
order condition resulting from Pareto-optimality. The extension to continuous-
discrete applications (Blundell, Chiappori, Magnac, and Meghir, 2007) is very
recent because it implies complex technical developments. A few years be-
fore, Van Soest (1995) considered a discrete choice model of joint labor sup-
ply within the family, but it did not take into account the negotiation process
within the household, and it did not test or impose the restrictions implied
by the optimality of the joint decision. Vermeulen (2006) made another step
to introduce discrete (female) labor supply, but his model does not impose
Pareto-optimality of discrete labor supply decision.
3 Modeling intra-household decisions in two specific ex-
amples
An important issue in modeling residential and job location is the interdepen-
dence of these two decisions, both at the individual level and at the household
level. It can be argued that the choice of residential location is made condi-
tional on the workplace, or vice versa (Waddell, 1996). We can also argue that
the choice of residential location is made in different time frames according
to the life cycle of individuals. What households then consider in their joint
location decisions, with a varying degree of importance along their life cycle,
are the chances of each active member in the household to access a good job
in each alternative location, which determines the accessibility to jobs of each
household member, from any given residential location.
We present here an innovative perspective on the interdependence between
residential location and workplace of spouses, taking into account the process
of negotiation within the household, the travel time of each spouse, and the
job accessibility for each spouse. For this we propose models of residential
location to give clear answers to various theoretical and empirical issues con-
cerning: the residential location conditional on workplaces and the joint choice
of residential location and workplace of each spouse.
This work has allowed expanding and developing models that correct the
bias in the individual value of time of spouses. This is achived by measuring
separately the influence of explanatory variables on (1) the decision-making
process within the household and (2) the value of time of spouses. The bar-
gaining power is taken into account to analyze the effect of the commuting
time of spouses to the household residential location choice. For more details
on the modeling framework of the results developed below see Chiappori, de
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Palma, Picard, and Inoa (2013).
3.1 Mode choice and spouses travel times
The differences between male and female observed travel times depend (1)
on spouses endogenous joint mode choices, (2) on the distribution of male
and female jobs over the region (marginal distribution of the destination of
morning commuting trips), (3) on the distribution of dwellings over the region
(marginal distribution of the origin of morning commuting trips), as well as (4)
on the household joint residential and job location choices. The link between
the marginal distributions of origins (home) and destinations (work place)
and their joint distribution is partially explained by the spouses bargaining
powers for location choice in the household. If the women’s bargaining power is
larger than the men’s one, then the joint distribution of household residential
location and spouses’ job locations results in a reduction in woman’s travel
time compared to man’s travel time.
In this section, we make a first step at disentangling the effects of these
different sources, focusing on the relative reduction in actual women’s and
men’s travel times (compared to all potential travel times) resulting from
their respective bargaining powers.
Using data form the 1999 Census in Paris Region, we analyze the dis-
tributions of spouses’ potential and actual travel times, and interpret their
differences in the light of respective bargaining powers. Travel times are com-
puted using the dynamic transport network model METROPOLIS (de Palma
and Marchal, 2002). The Paris Region is composed by 8 “départements”: Paris,
3 départements around Paris (“inner ring”), and 4 départements farther away
(“outer ring”). The city of Paris accounts for 20 arrondissements that corre-
spond to 20 communes. The region contains 10,724,748 inhabitants for a total
of 4,510,369 households. Household location and workplace are observed only
in a 5% sample. About half of the individuals in this 5% sample work, which
represents 242,516 workers, among which 239,499 work in Paris area. We fi-
nally restrict our sample to couples in which both spouses live and work in the
Paris Region, which leads to 60,798 dual earners households (the difference
corresponds to singles and one worker families).
Commuting network distances and travel times in chosen alternatives are
computed using individual information on actual residential location and
workplace, and reported in Table 1, in our sample of 60,798 dual-earner house-
holds. These distances and travel times correspond to the actual, or observed
commuting trips. The upper (resp. medium) part of the table reports distance
and travel time information for women (resp. men), and the lower part of the
table reports the average differences and tests the statistical significance of
these differences.
In the chosen alternatives, women’s commuting distances and travel times
are shorter than men’s. The average difference is 2.27 km and 5.67 minutes
through the public transportation network, and 1.85 km and 2.23 minutes
through the private car network. The standard errors are those of the average
difference between female and male actual commuting distances and travel
times. The t-Stats are the ratios of the Mean to Std Err columns. Under the
null hypothesis that the male and female average distances and travel times
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are equal, this statistic follows a Student distribution. For the 4 variables
considered, the absolute values of the t-Stats are very large, and the null
hypothesis is clearly rejected: actual commuting distances and travel times
are significantly lower for women than for men.
This difference may come from two different phenomena: (1) the marginal
distributions of dwellings (irrespectively of the male and female workplaces)
is such that dwellings are on average closer to female jobs than to men jobs;
(2) the distribution of dwellings conditional on female and male workplaces
is such that, for a specific household, the dwelling is closer to the woman’s
workplace than to the man’s workplace.
In order to quantify the first phenomenon, we randomly select 9 hypothet-
ical residential locations for each household, independently from the husband
and wife workplaces. To do so, we consider a uniform distribution over the
5 million dwellings of the region. Equivalently, we perform importance sam-
pling of communes, with weights proportional to the number of dwelling in
this commune (see Chapter 2.5 for more details on importance sampling). Fol-
lowing this strategy, we build a sample of dwelling locations independent from
both spouses workplaces, and the distribution of these hypothetical dwellings
is statistically identical to the marginal distribution of dwellings in the region.
The resulting distances and travel times are reported in Table 2, which is
built on a sample of 60,798*9=547,182 hypothetical (unchosen) alternatives
for residential location. The structure of Table 2 is the same as the one of
Table 1, except that the figures are now those of hypothetical travel times.
Table 1. Actual commuting distances and travel times
Variable Mean Std Dev Min Max
Women
Network Distance (public, km) 13.151 13.973 0.25 134.73
Network Distance (private, km) 10.710 11.716 0.25 107.32
Travel time (public, minute) 42.574 34.936 1.00 384.56
Travel time (private, minute) 15.200 14.248 0.76 151.51
Men
Network Distance (public, km) 15.417 15.047 0.25 134.73
Network Distance (private, km) 12.557 12.620 0.25 109.12
Travel time (public, minute) 48.242 36.732 1.00 384.56
Travel time (private, minute) 17.431 15.199 0.76 149.36
Difference (Women - Men) Mean Std Err t-Stat p-value
Network Distance (public, km) -2.266 0.083 -27.21 <0.01%
Network Distance (private, km) -1.847 0.070 -26.45 <0.01%
Travel time (public, minute) -5.668 0.206 -27.57 <0.01%
Travel time (private, minute) -2.231 0.084 -26.41 <0.01%
In the hypothetical case in which households would randomly choose a
residential location independent from husband’s and wife’s workplaces, the
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Table 2. Hypothetical commuting distances and travel times using the
marginal distribution of dwellings
Variable Mean Std Dev Min Max
Women
Network Distance (public, km) 31.712 21.177 0.33 182.33
Network Distance (private, km) 26.995 19.399 0.33 155.90
Travel time (public, minute) 86.200 50.193 1.32 564.52
Travel time (private, minute) 35.020 20.778 1.00 233.01
Men
Network Distance (public, km) 31.154 20.813 0.35 182.33
Network Distance (private, km) 26.464 19.020 0.35 155.90
Travel time (public, minute) 84.844 48.704 1.40 564.52
Travel time (private, minute) 34.469 20.355 1.05 233.01
Difference (Women - Men) Mean Std Err t-Stat p-value
Network Distance (public, km) 0.558 0.0401 13.90 <0.01%
Network Distance (private, km) 0.531 0.0367 14.46 <0.01%
Travel time (public, minute) 1.356 0.0945 14.34 <0.01%
Travel time (private, minute) 0.551 0.0393 14.01 <0.01%
average commuting distances and travel times would be approximately multi-
plied by 2. Stated differently, the fact that households (partially) adjust their
residential location choice to the spouses’ workplaces divides by 2 the spouses
commuting distances and travel times, compared to the hypothetical case in
which they would randomly pick one of the existing dwellings. More interest-
ingly, in this hypothetical situation, women’s commuting distances and travel
times would be slightly larger than men’s travel times. This means that, on
average, dwellings are marginally closer to male jobs than to female jobs. The
fact that actual commuting distances and travel times are shorter for wives
than for men according to Table 1 cannot come from the marginal distributions
of dwellings and jobs because the relationship is reversed in Table 2, but it
comes from the conditional distribution of dwellings given spouses workplaces.
Stated differently, the endogenous household residential location favors wives
rather than husbands, which suggests a larger bargaining power for women
than men in the residential location choice. This result is also consistent with
Abraham and Hunt (1997), who explained that the probability of moving is
more strongly related to commuting distance for women than for men, which
results in shorter commuting distance for women after a relocation.
Note also that the endogenous residential location reduces more actual
travel time of women compared to men by public transit than by private car.
Given that women have a stronger tendency than men to commute by public
transit, this result suggests that households locate so as to favor woman’s
commuting by transit.
The fact that both dwellings and jobs are rather located in the center of
the region divides by about 2 the distances and by about 2.5 the travel times
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in comparison with the hypothetical situation in which dwellings and jobs
would be uniformly and independently distributed among the communes. In
this even more hypothetical case, the average distance between dwellings and
jobs would be 66 km both through public and private networks, and it would
represent an average travel time of 215 min by public transportation and 80
minutes by car.
The geographical distribution of actual commuting time for women and
men by public transportation and private care are depicted in Figure 1 and
Figure 2, respectively, by gender. The "Other" category corresponds to com-
munes with no observed trip by the mode considered, for the gender consid-
ered. Actual commuting times in public transportation and private car are
increasing functions of the distance to the center of the region, in which most
of the jobs are concentrated. The difference in travel times between the outer
ring and the central part of the region (Paris and inner ring) is more pro-
nounced for public transportation than for private car, which reflects the fact
that the public transportation network is concentrated in the center of the
region and is poorly adapted to trips from the outer ring to the outer ring.
The geographical distribution of relative (woman-to-man) travel times de-
picted in Figure 3 shows that women work closer to their dwelling than men
in the outer ring, whereas, for households living in Paris or in the inner ring,
the husband’s workplace is closer to the dwelling than the wife’s workplace.
This is consistent with the fact that men’s jobs are concentrated in the core
of the region, whereas female jobs are more uniformly spread over the region.
3.2 Car ownership and mode choice
Using the same sample as in Section 3.1, we estimate a multinomial logit
model of residential location conditional on husband and wife workplaces,
as a function of local dwelling price (per square meter, in log) and spouses’
actual travel time, by mode and gender. Table 3 shows results of two different
models. In the first model, the Value of Time (coefficient of the travel time
variable) only depends on mode and gender. In the second model, the travel
time variable is crossed not only with mode and gender, as in the first model,
but also with the number of cars owned by the household.
The Price has the usual negative sign and is highly significant in both
models. According to the first model, household location is slightly more
sensitive to woman’s than man’s travel time by private car (|-0.0212| is sig-
nificantly larger than |-0.183|), but it is twice more sensitive to woman’s than
man’s travel time by transit. The second model helps understanding such
differences. Travel time by private car (both for husband and wife) has no
influence on household location for households with no car, which is totally
consistent. Households do not care how much time husband or wife would
spend commuting by car, when they have no access to any car.
For each household, 9 unchosen alternatives are generated using impor-
tance sampling, alternatives corresponds to the 1300 communes of the Paris
Region.
The difference between the coefficients of travel time by private car for
the wife in households with 0 or 1 car is not statistically significant. For the
husband, it is the difference between 1 and 2 cars which is not significant. This
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(a) Wife
(b) Husband
Figure 1. Public transportation observed commuting times11
(a) Wife
(b) Husband
Figure 2. Private vehicle observed commuting times12
(a) Public transportation
(b) Private vehicle
Figure 3. Geographical distribution of relative travel times13
Table 3. Residential location choice as a function of travel time
Parameter Coefficient Std Err t Stat Pr>|t|
Travel time by mode and gender
Log(Price) -3.7977 0.0314 -120.9 <.0001
Travel time (public transportation) Wife -0.0325 0.0005 -69.59 <.0001
Travel time (public transportation) Husband -0.0172 0.0005 -36.58 <.0001
Travel time (private car) Wife -0.0212 0.0010 -21.68 <.0001
Travel time (private car) Husband -0.0183 0.0010 -18.87 <.0001
Travel times by sex, mode, and number of cars
Log(Price) -4.0008 0.0323 -123.87 <.0001
Travel time (public transportation) Wife, no car -0.0578 0.0023 -25.57 <.0001
Travel time (public transportation) Wife, 1 car -0.0394 0.0007 -56.9 <.0001
Travel time (public transportation) Wife, 2 cars -0.0233 0.0006 -36.07 <.0001
Travel time (public transportation) Husband, no car -0.0414 0.0023 -17.84 <.0001
Travel time (public transportation) Husband, 1 car -0.0232 0.0007 -33.31 <.0001
Travel time (public transportation) Husband, 2 cars -0.0094 0.0007 -14.46 <.0001
Travel time (private car) Wife, no car -0.0059 0.0048 -1.23 0.2191
Travel time (private car) Wife, 1 car -0.0114 0.0014 -7.89 <.0001
Travel time (private car) Wife, 2 cars -0.0319 0.0014 -22.97 <.0001
Travel time (private car) Husband, no car -0.0075 0.0047 -1.58 <.0001
Travel time (private car) Husband, 1 car -0.0169 0.0014 -11.89 <.0001
Travel time (private car) Husband, 2 cars -0.0191 0.0014 -13.95 <.0001
means that the husband’s commuting time by private car becomes relevant in
residential location choice as soon as there is at least one car in the household.
By contrast, the wife’s commuting time by car becomes really relevant only
when there is at least 2 cars in the household. This gives a strong indication
that the husband has the priority to use the car to commute when there is
competition between spouses for the use of the unique car.
The influence of travel time by public transportation on residential location
is decreasing with the number of cars in the household, both for the wife and
for the husband. This influence nearly disappears for men when there are
two cars in the household, suggesting that the husband usually commutes by
car and does not care about transit travel times when there are 2 cars in
the household. These results are consistent with the fact that, on the one
hand, public transportation is a substitute for private car when household
members can easily reach a station, which is usually the case in Paris and
inner ring, whereas it is a complement when individuals have to drive to
the station in order to use public transportation. The fact that husband’s
transit commuting time plays virtually no role in residential location of two-car
households, whereas the wife’s transit commuting time still matters suggests
that, when there are two cars in the household, men will anyway entirely
commute by car, whereas wives may go to the station by car.
3.3 Couple residential location conditional on spouses
workplaces
We now discuss the results obtained by Chiappori, de Palma, Picard, and
Inoa (2013) in a structural collective model assuming that spouses workplaces
are chosen before the residential location. In that case, like in Section 3.2,
residential location depends on the spouses actual commuting times between
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the current workplace and the potential residential locations contemplated.
However, by contrast with the reduced-form model estimated in Section 3.2,
we analyze here a structural model explicitly taking into account both spouses
individual preferences and respective bargaining powers rather than mixing
them in a household utility function which may or may not be consistent with
collective rationality. To the best of our knowledge, this the only contribution
to the literature that takes into account the role of the within-family decision
process and spouses bargaining powers in a residential location.Picard, de
Palma, and Dantan (2013) develop and estimate a one-step structural model
to disentangle bargaining powers from spouses’ values of time in a joint mode
choice model. They find results similar to the results presented in this section
concerning the determinants of the bargaining power. The other contribu-
tions such as Abraham and Hunt (1997); Beharry-Borg, Hensher, and Scarpa
(2009) do consider the influence of individual characteristics on residential lo-
cation choices, but the associated coefficients mix the influence of individual
preferences and bargaining powers.
The objective here is to analyze the within-family decision process involv-
ing bargaining between members with diverging preferences , objectives and
constraints. Spouses may or may not have diverging preferences concerning
local amenities, and these preferences probably differ from the preferences of
singles. The same individual will tend to enjoy bars and discos when he is
single, and open spaces when he is married with children. Given this change
in preferences of the same individual when he marries, it is not possible to
disentangle respective bargaining powers and spouses’ preferences for local
amenities, and we will not try to do so. Instead, we consider a joint prefer-
ence of the household for local amenities.
On the opposite, it is obvious that the husband preference for his own
commuting time (let’s call it Value of Time (VOT), although it is more com-
plex when utility is not linear in travel time because then VOT is given by
the local derivative of utility with respect to commuting time, and it varies
with commuting time) is different from the wife’s preference for the husband
commuting time. The influence of the husband’s commuting time on house-
hold residential location mixes (1) the role of the husband’s VOT, which a
priori depends only on the husband’s individual characteristics and (2) the
role of respective spouses bargaining powers, which a priori depends both on
the husband and wife individual characteristics. Similarly, the influence of
the wife’s commuting time on household residential location mixes the role of
the wife’s VOT and of the respective spouses bargaining powers. As a result,
neglecting spouses’ respective bargaining powers leads to biased estimates of
the values of time of the household members.
Chiappori, de Palma, Picard, and Inoa (2013) have developed a method
to disentangle the bargaining power and the spouses VOTs, and to measure
separately the influence of explanatory variables on the bargaining power and
the value of time. They applied this method to the same data as in Sections
3.1 and 3.2. Each spouse’s bargaining power is normalized to 1/2 in the ref-
erence case (the two spouses are French and 20 years old), and the husband
and wife bargaining powers always sum to 1, so that bargaining powers can
be interpreted as percentages. Any increase in the woman’s bargaining power
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corresponds to a decrease of the same percentage for the husband’s bargaining
power. The econometric results show that the woman’s age and man’s na-
tionality play a crucial role in determining bargaining power. The magnitude
of the effects depends on the covariates considered, but some general patterns
emerge. Each spouse bargaining power increases with age, but the increase is
faster for the wife than for the man. Consider two equally old men. The wife
of the first man is 10 years older than the wife of the second. Our estimates
show that, in this case, the bargaining power of the first wife is 4.28% larger
than that of the second woman. Consider now a third couple, in which the
wife has the same age as the wife in the first couple, but the husband is 10
years older than the husband in the first couple. Then, the bargaining power
of the husband in this third couple is 0.78% larger than that of the first hus-
band. Consider now the first couple 10 years later. Each spouse is 10 years
older and, as a result, the wife’s bargaining power has increased more the the
man’s. As a consequence, the wife’s bargaining power tends to increase over
time (by 4.28%- 0.78%= 3.5% each 10 years).
The bargaining power of the husband is reduced by about 4.5% when he
is foreign, whereas the wife’s bargaining power does not significantly depend
on her nationality.
The econometric results of this model also show a large bias in the measure-
ment of spouses’ VOT when the bargaining power is not taken into account
in a residential location model. For example, there is a 20% underestimation
of the value of time for a 40-year-old French man, which becomes a 18% over-
estimation for a 40-year-old French man. For the wife, the VOT is always
overestimated when the bargaining power is omitted, and the bias is 15% for
a 40-year-old French woman and 10% for a 20-year-old French woman. There
is an additional bias upwards in the measurement of the VOT of foreign men,
when the bargaining power is omitted.
The commuting cost estimated in the model is a concave function of com-
muting time for each spouse. The value of time for a man (respectively
woman) of 20 years old is about e11 (respectively e8) per hour at the origin
(i.e. when the travel time tends to 0). The value of time is a decreasing
function of age.
3.4 Accessibility in a residential location, workplace, and
job type model in one- and two-worker households
We now discuss the extension to dual-earner households of the single or one-
worker household structural model developed by Inoa, Picard, and de Palma
(2013). By contrast to Sections 3.2 and 3.3, this model assumes that residen-
tial location is chosen before individual workplaces. This model analyzes a
three-level nested logit model of residential location, workplace, and job type
choice. Residential location is the upper-level choice, workplace the middle-
level choice, and job type is chosen at the lower level.
The decision tree is fully consistent and rational: on one hand, workplace
choice is anticipated at the upper-level residential location choice; on the other
hand, the middle-level workplace choice is made conditional on the residen-
tial location actually chosen. This model allows defining and computing an
individual-specific measure of attractiveness of geographical units, which takes
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(a) Age 20
(b) Age 40
Figure 4. Baised and unbaised value of time
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into account the local distribution of job types, and individual preferences for
job types. This measure of attractiveness of geographical units is fully con-
sistent with the model, from the theoretical and econometric points of view.
It corresponds to a log-sum term going up the decision tree from the lower
level to the middle level. Going one step up in the decision tree, we obtain an
individual-specific measure of accessibility to jobs, which takes into account
the heterogeneity in VOT and preferences for different job types captured in
the measure of attractiveness of potential workplaces.
The model is estimated on single or one-worker households, using the same
data as in Sections 3.1 to 3.3. At the lower level of the decision tree, prefer-
ences for job types depend on gender, education and number of children (for
women only). The same variables also explain observed heterogeneity in the
Values of Time at the middle level of the decision tree. At the upper level, ob-
served heterogeneity in preferences for local amenities is even richer, with the
introduction of profession of household dead, and household composition and
income, crossed with the local distribution of the same characteristics, in order
to reflect the tendency of households to locate close to similar households.
4 Conclusion
We have discussed in this article different models describing mode choice, res-
idential location and workplace of the various members of a family, mainly
the husband and wife, but more sophisticated models should also take into
account the children. The key concept introduced in this chapter is the nego-
tiation within the couple, that is to say, the decision-making process related to
joint choices, such as the residential location, which is usually, but not always,
unique in couples.
The tools we have discussed in this chapter are based on the work devel-
oped during recent decades in the field of economics of the family. They will
revolutionize discrete choice models used in transport and urban economics, in
the sense that the decisions are no more described as the outcome of a unique
decision maker. Instead, in collective discrete choice models, the decisions
depend on preferences and constraints of two individuals tied by economic,
but also emotional ties. Discrete choice theory still has to be adapted to
this new way of approaching the individual decisions. Current literature in
transportation (Abraham and Hunt, 1997) has developed a few family deci-
sion models. However these models ignore the bargaining process within the
family, as studied by family economists (Chiappori, 1988; Chiappori, 1992).
An objective of the research is to provide new tools for researchers in urban
and transportation economics, as well as in engineering. In particular, we plan
to provide collective choice models to the integrated transport and land use
tool, UrbanSim. This article begins a search path that may be still very long
and hopefully fruitful.
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